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1. Introduction: the party system at EU level  
Political parties have been important actors of the European integration. As soon as 
the borders between European countries have become more porous, the relations amongst 
national parties of similar political orientation have become stronger. This process has led 
to the creation of several organisations at the European level, of which the most relevant 
are the Political Groups in the European Parliament (EPPGs) and the European Political 
Parties (EuPPs), formerly known as Political Parties at the European Level (PPELs). These 
structures have progressively increased their resources, becoming less dependent, 
functionally and politically, from the national parties. Most of the literature has concentred 
its efforts in analysing the Europeanisation of the national political parties, while few have 
been devoted to analyse the tensions between the national actors and the European actors 
and practically no effort has been done to study the relations between the two Euro-level 
party organisations. 
According to Bardi (2006), the Richard Katz’s and Peter Mair’s (1993) three-face 
scheme1 can be analytically applied to study party politics also at the European level, where 
the Party in Public Office is represented by European Parliament Political Groups and the 
Party in Central Office by the European Political Parties. The main difference is that at the 
European Level the Party on the Ground is usually represented national parties, rather than 
by individual members. The relations between these three faces then would be the 
“Europarty”, here used to indicate the comprehensive structure of the European party 
system, as elaborated by Figure 1. 
 
 
1 Political parties can be studied dividing their organisation in three different faces: the Party in 
Public Office (PPO), the Party in Central Office (PCO), the Party on the Ground (PoG). 
 3 
Figure 1: the Europarty structure as the three faces of party organization 
 
Source: Calossi (2016, 26) 
 
This model is useful to study the level of integration of the three faces for those 
European political families that consider the European integration as a long-term objective 
and a not-reversible process, such as the Christian-Democrats/People’s Party, the Socialists, 
the Liberals or the Greens. According to this perspective the full integration between the 
three faces is an objective of political actors. In addition, for those political parties that 
advocate to the evolution of the European Union in a quasi-statual entity, the three-face 
scheme, useful to study the national parties, should be used simply to analyse at what 
extent European parties have become more similar to national parties. 
Many European political actors do not agree with this pro-integration perspective: for 
them, the European integration should be slowed down (according to a Eurosceptical, Euro-
Realist or Euro-Critical perspective), or even completely reversed (Anti-European 
perspective). Amongst this diverse congerie of parties, many seek however forms of 
cooperation at the European level. The alliances of those parties do not function as and 
neither aim at functioning as national parties do. Therefore, they cannot be analysed 
through conceptual models that have been created in order to analyse national parties, 
such as the Katz and Mair’s one. In these cases, it would be more useful to interpret the 
European level of party activities as a European face (the “fourth face”) of national party 
organisation (Sozzi 2011). According to this model, national parties rather than being a face 
of the Europarty (the PoG) are still at the heart of the EU political system; on the contrary, 
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the European structures are merely a weak and dependent face of the national party 
(Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: the European dimension as the “fourth face” of party organization 
 
Source: Calossi (2014, 92) 
 
2. The development of the euro-party structure 
From a historical perspective, the extra-parliamentarian cooperation amongst political 
parties begun even before that in the European institutions. In fact, the first transnational 
associations of political parties were external to the institutions. These so-called 
“internationals” allowed socialist parties, until the First World War usually opposition 
parties, to coordinate their activities with sister parties, while the bourgeois counterparts, 
which were ruling parties, could do that through institutional and official diplomatic 
channels. Thus, the first partisan transnational association was the Second International 
(also known as Socialist International) in 1889. Communist parties established their own 
International in 1919. Later, other political movements, as a consequence of the more 
general organisational “contagion from the left” (Duverger 1953), formed their own 
political Internationals. Among the most relevant, there were the International Secretariat 
of Democratic Parties of Christian Inspiration (formed in in 1925 and become the Christian 
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Democrat World Union in 1961), the Liberal International (in 1947), the International 
Democrat Union (in 1983), and finally the Global Greens (in 2001). So, also before the 
establishment of the European Community at least four political families already had their 
own International. However, even if the majority of the member parties of the 
Internationals were European, the European integration was at the centre of their interests 
and activities. So, if we limit our scope to a purely European scenario, we have to notice 
that during the first phase of the integration the only supranational structures active in 
Europe were the political groups inside the Parliamentary assembly of the European 
Community.  
 
2.1. The European Parliament Political Groups 
It was only after the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
that European parties began to cooperate within the European space through specific 
European organizations. Already in 1953, the ECSC Common Assembly decided to regroup 
its members along ideological lines, rather than by nationality, thus being the first European 
institution that saw the emergence of transnational cooperation amongst European 
national political parties (Marquand 1979).  
Through the years, two concurrent processes, the widening and the strengthening of the 
EP, have characterized its evolution (Hix et al. 2007). Concerning the widening, this has 
happened both for the number of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and for 
the number of political groups. About the former, the first elected EP had only 410 
members. In 1980, 24 new MEPs arrived from the 10th MS (Greece). Its size reached 518 
members after the 1986 enlargement and 567 after the German reunification. Quota 626 
was reached after the Nordic enlargement in 1995. After the two phases of the “Big 
Enlargement”, MEPs became 736, even if it reached temporarily the maximum of 785 until 
the 2009 EP elections. In 2007, the Lisbon treaty fixed the number to 750, which will 
become 705 starting from the after-Brexit 2019–2024 legislature2. Concerning the number of 
political groups, their increasing was due both to the entrance into the EP of national 
 
2 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=en&type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20080226BKG22350 #title3 (accessed 28 February 2019).   
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parties with political backgrounds different from those of the original three political families 
(as it was the case with the Gaullists from France and the Conservatives from the UK), and 
for the abandonment of the anti-European stance of some political families (as it was the 
case of the communist parties, which sent their MEPs to the EP only in the early seventies). 
Tables 1 and 2 show the evolution of the EP group linked to the corresponding party family.  
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Table 1: Evolution of groups in the European Parliament (1/2) 
Spiritual 
Family 
Name of Group 
Before 1979 1979 1984 1989 1994 
Christian 
Democrats 
Christian 
Democrat 
European People’s Party (EPP) 
European People’s Party 
and European 
Democrats (EPP-ED) 
Social 
Democrats 
Socialist European Socialist Party 
Liberals Liberal and Democrat 
Liberal Democrat and 
Riformist 
ELDR/ Radical European 
Alliance (REA) 
Conservatives 
European 
Conservative 
European Democrats EPP-ED / Forza Europa 
Left Communists and Allies 
Gauche Unitaire 
Européenne / 
Coalition des Gauches 
Gauche Unitaire 
Européenne - Nordic 
Green Left (GUE/NGL) 
Nationalists 
European Progressive 
Democrats 
European Democratic Alliance 
(EDA) / European Right (ER) 
EDA 
Greens . . Rainbow Greens Greens 
Regionalists . . Rainbow 
Radical European 
Alliance 
Euro-sceptics . . . . Europe of Nations 
Technical 
Groups 
. 
Technical of 
Independents 
. . . 
Groups 6 7 8 10 9 
Source:  Calossi 2016, 29 
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Table 2: Evolution of groups in the European Parliament (2/2). 
Source: Calossi 2016, 30 
 
As for the strengthening, since the direct election of its members in 1979, the EP has 
continuously increased its powers and prerogatives, at the expenses of national legislatures 
but also of other EU organisms (especially of the Council of Ministers). Many factors 
incentivize the MEPs to become members of an EPPG, rather than remaining non-attached 
members. Some stem from the EP's rules and procedures, as well as by the EP's day-to-day 
functioning. Belonging to one of the main groups of the EP is very important for individual 
Spiritual Family 
Name of Group 
1999 2004 2009 2014 
Christian 
Democrats 
European People’s Party and European 
Democrats (EPP-ED) 
European People’s Party 
Socialist 
Democrats 
European Socialist 
Party 
Socialist 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats (S&D) 
Liberals 
European Liberal 
Democratic and 
Reformist Party 
(ELDR) 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 
Conservatives EPP-ED European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) 
Left Gauche Unitaire Européenne - Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) 
Nationalists 
Union for Europe of 
Nations (UEN) 
UEN . 
Europe of Nations and 
Freedom (ENF) 
Greens Greens – Free European Alliance 
Regionalists Greens – Free European Alliance 
Euro-sceptics 
Europe of 
Democracies and 
Diversities 
Independence 
and Democracy 
Europe of Freedom 
and Democracy  
Europe of Freedom and 
Direct Democracy 
Technical Groups 
Technical of 
Independents 
. . . 
Groups 8 7 7 8 
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national party delegations: this helps obtaining material resources and to acquire political 
advantages, such as the allocation of positions (rapporteurships and chairs) in the EP and its 
committees (Attinà 1997). 
With regards to their internal functioning, at the time of the appointed MEPs (1957-1979), 
little or no centralization of decision-making powers existed. Later (1979-1987), groups’ 
organization became more complex and internal rules were formalized. In the so-called 
“law-making EP” (1987-2004), instructions for monitoring MEPs behaviour were also 
adopted (Bartolini 2005; Kreppel 2002). After the 2004 Big Enlargement, EPP, S&D and 
ALDE further strengthened their organizational complexity (Bressanelli 2014). 
 
2.2. European Political Parties 
If we only consider coordination outside the EP, alliances of national parties at the 
European level existed even before Regulation 2004/2003, which in 2003 clearly expressed 
the existence of the Political parties at European Level (PPELs). Although the concrete 
implementation of direct elections was delayed until 1979, in the seventies the first 
“Transnational Party Federations” were formed in anticipation to the forth-coming direct 
elections. This was at the base of pro-European party families’ choice to establish 
supranational structures to deal primarily with the elections or, at least, the coordination of 
national parties’ electoral campaigns. These party organizations were: the Confederation of 
Socialist parties of the European Community, founded in April 1974, the Federation of 
Liberal and Democrat parties of the European Communities, established in March 1976, and 
the “European People's Party - Federation of Christian Democratic parties in the European 
Community”, created in June 1976. The conservative “European Progressive Democrats” 
and the “Communists and Allies” did not create such extraparliamentary structures (Hanley 
2008).  
Before the introduction of the funding of the PPELs only other two party families 
decided to establish their own extraparliamentary organisation: the Greens, which in 1984 
established the “European Green Coordination” (EGC), and some regionalist progressive 
parties, which in October 1994 established the “European Free Alliance” (EFA). The 
federations seemed therefore to be born as "emanation of the political groups in the 
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European Parliament, who felt necessary to rely on party organizations present at the 
European level" (Coosemans 2000). In the same period, nominal changes prepared some 
federations to become closer to proper political parties. In 1992, the Confederation of 
Socialist parties got the name of “Party of the European Socialists” (PES); In 1993, the 
Green Coordination became the “European Federation of Green Parties” (EFGP); in the 
same year, the Federation of Liberal Democrat and Reform Parties took the name of 
“European Liberal Democrats and Reformists” (ELDR). 
In 2004, the introduction of the public funding to PPELs acted as a stimulus for even 
Euro-sceptic families to establish their own PPEL. The increase in the number of EuPPs has 
been paralleled by the expansion of parties’ competences: initially limited to solely 
proposing vague and broad electoral platforms for the European elections, parties have 
gradually become more important to prepare and train candidates for the EP (Bardi et al. 
2010), and even to put forward candidates for the Presidency of the EU Commission, better 
known as Spitzenkandidat (Tab. 3). 
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Table 3 : European political parties, EP Political Groups and Spitzenkandidaten 
Full name European Political 
Party (EuPP) Acronym  
Year of 
recognition 
(dissolution) 
Closest 
EPPG Spitz. 2014 Spitz. 2019 
Party of European Socialists PES 1974 S&D M. Schulz F. Timmermans 
European People's Party EPP 1976 EPP J.C. Juncker M. Weber 
Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats in Europe ALDE 1976 ALDE 
G. 
Verhofstadt None 
European Green Party EGP 1984 G-EFA S. Keller & J. Bové 
S. Keller & B. 
Eickhout 
European Free Alliance EFA 1994 G-EFA S. Keller & J. Bové O. Junqueras 
European Democratic Party EDP 2004 ALDE G. Verhofstadt None 
Party of the European Left EL 2004 GUE-NGL A. Tsipras V. Tomic & N. Cue 
Alliance for Europe of the 
Nations AEN 
2004 
(2009)   NA NA 
Europeans United for 
Democracy EUD 
2006 
(2017) GUE-NGL None NA 
Alliance of Independent 
Democrats in Europe AIDE 
2006 
(2008)   NA NA 
Alliance of Conservatives and 
Reformists in Europe ACRE 2010 ECR None J. Zahradil 
European Christian Political 
Movement ECPM 2010 ECR None NA 
European Alliance for Freedom EAF 2011 (2017) ENF None NA 
Movement for a Europe of 
Liberties and Democracy MELD 
2012 
(2016)   None NA 
Alliance of European National 
Movements AENM 
2012 
(2017) ENF None NA 
Alliance of Direct Democracy in 
Europe ADDE 
2015 
(2017) EFD
2 NA NA 
Mouvement pour une Europe 
des Nations et des Libertés MENL 2015 ENF NA None 
Alliance for Peace and Freedom APF 2016 (2017) None NA NA 
Coalition pour la Vie et la Famille CVF 2017 (2017) None NA NA 
Source: Parties’ and groups’ websites; http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/grants/funding_amounts_parties_01-2019.pdf 
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3. The relationship between EPPGs and EuPPs 
Most authors underline the importance of groups by emphasizing their greater force 
than the EuPPs (Attiná 1990; Bardi 1994; Hix and Lord 1997; Kreppel 2002; Hix, Noury and 
Roland 2007; McElroy and Benoit 2010) others have focused on the latter (and previously on 
federations) emphasizing parties’ progressive consolidation and their potential for further 
development (Hix 1996, 2002; Ladrech 2002, 2007; Bardi and Calossi 2009; Gagatek 2009). 
However, in the literature there is a general consensus in considering the relation between 
the two Eurostructures as an unbalanced distribution of resources and responsibilities, with 
the Groups in a dominant position with respect to the EuPPs (Hanley 2008; Calossi 2011; 
Bressanelli 2014).3  
As for the affiliations to these two Eurostructures, they are mutually independent: a 
national party can have membership of a EuPP without belonging to the corresponding 
Political Group, or its MEPs can belong to a group without being affiliated to any EuPP. 
 
3.1. Membership overlap 
One crucial element of the relationship between these two European structures is 
therefore the degree of overlap between the EuPP and the EPPG. This can be measured by 
the percentage of MEPs belonging to the EPPGs who are also members of a national party 
that is officially registered as a member of the corresponding EuPP4. National parties 
represent the core membership of political groups and EuPPs, even if some of them allow 
also the individual membership. Tables 4 and 5 show the degree of overlap of EuPPs over 
EPPGs for the last two legislatures. All EPPGs are taken in consideration; as for the EuPPs, 
considering the high number of them (some of which are almost unknown, are not 
politically active and have no or very few elected MEPs), we have considered only those 
that are composed of at least four “relevant” national political parties. The relevance 
 
3 The most appropriate indicator to measure the “strength” of EPPGs is indeed their revealed 
cohesion in voting (among others, Hix 2002, Cicchi 2016, Bardi et al 2014). However, due to the lack 
of a similar indicator for EuPPs, we have opted to omit this element.  
4 For instance, the overlap of the Party of European Socialists over the S&D group is measured by 
the percentage of S&D MEPs who are part of a national party that has membership in the Party of 
European Socialists 
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criterion for inclusion is the same of the Euromanifesto project (Braun et al. 2010; Schmitt et 
al. 2016). 
 
Table 4: EuPPs’ overlap with EPPGs, Seventh legislature (2009-2014) 
EuPP 
MEPs from NPs 
affiliated to EuPP 
EPPG 
MEPs belonging 
to EPPG 
Ratio 
EPP 263 EPP 265 99.2% 
PSE 161 S&D 184 87.5% 
ELDR 75 
ALDE 84 
89.3% 
EDP 9 10.7% 
EGP 46 
G-EFA 55 
83.6% 
EFA 6 10.9% 
EL 24 GUE-NGL 35 68.6% 
AECR 54 ECR 55 98.2% 
n/a 0 EFD 30 0.0% 
Source: authors’ own calculation 
 
In the 7th legislature, the four oldest political families had a high level of identification 
between their EuPP and their own group. With the partial exception of the PES that - due to 
the Italian PD, at that time not affiliated to the PES - represents only the 88% of MEPs of the 
S&D group, the People’s Party, the Liberals and the alliance between Greens and 
Regionalists represented more than 90% of their respective groups. Similarly, the ECR group 
presented a high degree of identification with the European party AECR. On the extreme 
left the levels of Europeanisation were rather weak, while for the Eurosceptic right they 
equalled to zero, as there was not a corresponding EuPP to the group Europe of Freedom 
and Democracy. 
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Table 5 : EuPPs’ overlap with EPPGs, Eight legislature (2014-2019) 
EuPP 
MEPs from NPs 
affiliated to EuPP 
EPPG 
MEPs belonging 
to EPPG 
Ratio 
EPP 206 EPP 213 96.7% 
PSE 181 S&D 189 95.8% 
AECR 55 ECR 73 75.3% 
ALDE 50 
ALDE 68 
73.5% 
EDP 7 10.3% 
EGP 37 
G-EFA 50 
74.0% 
EFA 7 14.0% 
EL 29 GUE-NGL 52 55.8% 
MENL 28 ENF 40 70.0% 
ADDE 27 EFDD 42 64.3% 
Source: authors’ own calculation 
 
It is interesting to notice that in the 8th legislature most EuPPs reduce their overlap 
with their respective EPPGs. In the case of EPP, this is a marginal decrease (from 99% to 
96%), in all other cases the reduction is more considerable. AECR, or instance, reduces its 
overlap with the ECR group from 98% to 75%, due to the entrance at the beginning of the 8th 
legislature of independent MEPs and others linked to different EuPPs (the European 
Christian Political Movement and European Free Alliance).5 The two exceptions from this 
trend are the already mentioned PES (after the Italian PD joining the PES) and the 
Eurosceptic EFDD, finally witnessing the creation of a corresponding, full-fledged European 
political party, which is to be considered as an “emanation” of pre-existing parliamentary 
group. 
 
 
5 Despite being a member of the EuPP EFA, the Flemish conservative N-VA preferred to join the ECR 
group rather than the G-EFA group.  
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3.2. Balance of organizational strength  
So far, we have looked at the development of EPPGs and EuPPs and the formal relationship 
that exists between them, measured in terms of membership overlap. In this paragraph, we 
turn our attention to measuring the relationship between the organizational strength of 
EPPGs and EuPPs. As experts in organization studies maintain, two significant indicators of 
the strength of organizations are represented by economic and personnel’s resources of 
the organization (Scott 2013). Political parties, seen as organizations, are not alien to this 
perspective, even if also the membership plays an important role (Katz and Mair 1994; Hix 
2002). The case of the party politics at the EU level is, however, different from the national 
level, as there is not any direct affiliation of ordinary members to groups or EuPPs. 
Therefore, the availability of funds and staff are the best indicators to make comparison 
between the two kinds of EU actors.  
 
Figure 5: Aggregate trends in EP funding to EuPPs, EPPGs and foundations at European level (2005-2015) 
 
Source: authors’ own calculation on the basis of data from http://www.europarl.europa.eu 
 
As for the funding, a valid indicator to measure the balance of powers between 
groups and parties is by comparing the financial resources that come from the European 
Parliament. The EP funds are up to 85% of EuPPs’ expenses: this means EuPPs need to find 
at least other 15% of their total expenditures, which is usually represented by member 
parties’ fees. The EP funds, thus, are not the only ones political parties collect - but certainly 
87% 86% 84% 85% 
76% 73% 
68% 66% 65% 
61% 60% 
13% 14% 16% 15% 15% 
18% 20% 21% 
22% 
27% 25% 
9% 9% 11% 
12% 13% 13% 15% 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EPGS EuPPs Foundations
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represent a significant proportion of total revenue. In addition, as the two Eurostructures 
are funded by the same institution this allows us to understand which of the two is 
considered by the European institutions as the most important. Figure 5 above also includes 
the funds which since 2009 have been received also by the political foundations at 
European level (Bardi et al. 2014; Gagatek and Van Hecke 2011). As it can be seen, in 2005 
political groups were receiving the large majority (86%) of funds the EP devolved to partisan 
activity at the European level. At that time the groups’ funds were more than six times 
higher than those of parties. This amount has decreased significantly in the years due to 
increase share of funds given to the parties (up to 25%) and to the beginning of funding in 
2009 for the political foundations. However, the latest figures show that still the 60% of the 
funds allocated by the EP are devoted to the political groups. Nowadays these resources 
are still around two times and half bigger than those received by EuPPs.  
Table 5 below shows the disaggregated data and the ratio between EuPPs and EPPGs 
in terms of economic resources for the two legislatures taken into consideration6. As it can 
be seen, the group always has more economic resources than the party. Not surprisingly, 
those small European political parties (EPD, EFA), which share the same group with a bigger 
EuPP, have a particularly high ratio. In line with the trend highlighted by previous figure, it 
can be noted that all the ratios decrease between the 7th and the 8th legislature. Finally, the 
Conservative dyad shows a particularly skewed trend (from 11.2 to 3.0). 
 
6 For the economic resources, figures considered are those of the first year of the new terms (thus, 
the 2010 and 2015 official budget), as published by the European Parliament website.  
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Table 6: Economic resources of EPPGs and EuPPs and ratio, expressed in 
thousands of € 
European Political Parties European Parliament Groups Ratio EPPG/EuPP 
 EP7 EP8  EP7 EP8 EP7 EP8 
PES 3,395 5,828 S&D 14,011 15,265 4.1 2.6 
EPP 4,959 8,053 EPP 19,990 17,439 4.0 2.1 
ALDE 1,554 2,093 
ALDE 6,262 5,603 
4.0 2.7 
EPD 424 . 14.7 . 
AECR/ACRE 327 1951 ECR 3,648 5,959 11.2 3.0 
EGP 1,055 1,665 
G-EFA 3,896 4,152 
3.7 2.5 
EFA 339 635 11.5 6.5 
EL 708 1,484 GUE-NGL 2,530 4,304 3.6 2.9 
ADDE . 820 EFDD . 3,842 . 4.7 
MENF . 400 ENF . 1,586 . 3.9 
Source: authors’ elaboration from budget data available on www.europarl.europa.eu 
 
As for the staff7, even if EuPPs have progressively increased the number of their 
employees8, these figures are still very far from those given by the Political Groups, as it can 
be seen in table 6. In addition, we have to consider that Political Groups can also exploit 
EP’s staff resources for some functions.  
 
7 For the staff, data for EP7 comes from Calossi (2014) and refers to 2013, while data for EP8 comes 
from the official websites of EuPPs and EPPGs, accessed in 2017. 
8 In 1984 the People’s, Liberal and Socialist parties had in total 14 employees; in the current 
legislature they have 77 employees out of a total of 98 for the EuPPs taken into consideration. 
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Table 7: Staff of EPPGs and EuPPs and ratio 
European Political Parties European Parliament Groups Ratio EPPG/EuPP 
  EP7 EP8  EP7 EP8 EP7 EP8 
PES 25 29 S&D 240 278 9.6 9.6 
EPP 28 32 EPP 129 132 4.6 4.1 
ALDE 12 16 
ALDE 94 95 
7.8 5.9 
EPD 6 . 15.7 . 
AECR/ACRE 3 5 ECR 72 110 24 22 
EGP 12 12 
G-EFA 80 95 
6.7 7.9 
EFA 3 4 26.7 23.8 
EL 4 5 GUE-NGL 53 81 13.3 16.2 
ADDE . 13 EFDD . 31 . 2.4 
MENF . 2 ENF . n/a . n/a 
No information on ENF’s staff could be retrieved for the current legislature, therefore it has been recorded as 
“not available” (n/a) and the ratio could not be calculated. 
Source: Political Groups’ and EuPPs’ websites 
 
All EuPPs have staff resources many times less prominent than those of the 
correspondent political group. In the 7th legislature, the range varied from the People’s 
Party EPPG which has a number of staff employed 4.6 times higher than that of the EPP 
party, to the Conservative group staff which was 24 times higher than that of AECR. 
However, at that time AECR was still quite young in comparison with the other parties. Four 
years later the figures have slightly changed, almost all in the direction of the moderate 
strengthening of the EuPP in comparison to the EPPGs. The only exceptions to this are 
represented by the European Left and the European Green Party, that between EP7 and 
EP8 actually “lost” power in comparison to their corresponding EPPG. In the current 
legislature, in the Popular family the equilibrium between the party and the group is the less 
unbalanced, while on the contrary in the Conservative family the group is still by far 
stronger than the correspondent party, as well as the small EFA party. This is not surprising, 
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as for a small EuPP that shares the same EPPG with a bigger EuPP, the unbalance is 
necessarily high. 
One final element making EPPGs stronger than the EuPPs that needs to be considered 
is the presence of stricter requisites for their formation. In details, both for parties and 
groups there are two qualitative/political criteria (“sharing the same values” or “respecting 
the EU values”) applicants need to match in order to be recognized. In both cases, the 
control by the European Parliament and the recently established Authority for European 
Political Parties is not ex-ante but only ex-post, on request of a certain number of other 
MEPs. Therefore, we can affirm that qualitative criteria are not relevant to limit the 
establishment of new groups or parties, and the difference between the two processes of 
recognition must be analysed through the quantitative criteria. For political groups, there is 
the need of at least 25 MEPs coming from at least one fourth of member states (i.e. seven). 
For parties, the quantitative criterion is easier to be matched. Parties must have 
representation from at least one quarter of the Member States (i.e. seven), and one or both 
of the following: “(a) it must have received at least 3% of the votes cast in each of those 
Member States at the most recent European Parliament elections (b) or it must already 
be represented by Members, whether Members of the European Parliament for those 
states, or Members of the national Parliaments of those states, or Members of the regional 
Parliaments of those states, or Members of the regional Assemblies of those states”. In 
practice, as minimum criterion, seven regional parliamentarians can form a EuPP. 
In conclusion, while one of the main interests of the already established political 
parties and political groups is to render difficult the recognition of new actors (because new 
actors would participate in the division of resources given by the Parliament), the fact that 
EPPGs managed to do this in a more “efficient” way shows at what extent political parties 
are weaker than political groups in defending their main funding source. Because they are 
unable to limit the accession of new competitors into the political scene of new recognized 
(and funded) political parties (Calossi 2014). 
 
4. Conclusions 
This chapter focuses on party politics at the EU level, trying to fill some of the existing 
gaps in literature and empirical research. Even if many studies on the organizational aspects 
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of the European Parliament Political Groups (EPPGs) and the European Political Parties 
(EuPPs) have been carried out, literature is still scarce for what concerns the relationship 
between the two organizations. First of all, we have briefly described the 
institutionalization route of the EP groups and of the EuPPs (starting from their ancestors, 
the supranational party federations and the political parties at the European level); the 
presentation of the trends in funding to the groups, the parties and the so-called Euro-
foundations, and in staff composition, which have all been updated to the eighth EP 
legislature. The blatant result of our analysis it that the European Parliament Political 
Groups are, from all the point of views (resources, staff, and possibility to limit the 
establishment of new competitors), stronger the corresponding European Political Parties. 
This surely still represents a shortcoming that limits the emergence of a proper party 
system at the European level and weakens the European Democracy.  
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